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INTRODUCTION
One evening in Texas in 1995, Terrie Dittman had just bought a new van and was
driving home. As she pulled into her driveway, two men pointed guns and demanded
her new van. When Ms. Dittman attempted to back out of the driveway, away from
the men, one of the men shot at her five times, hitting her at least three times. Both
men fled, leaving the wounded Ms. Dittman in her driveway. They were eventually
captured, charged, and convicted of carjacking, conspiracy to commit carjacking, and
various firearms violations. When the defendants, Jeffrey Matthews and Michael
Cook, were presented at sentencing several months later, ajudge enhanced their sen-
tences by ten years pursuant to the Criminal Street Gang Statute, finding that the men
were members of the Crips, a criminal street gang, and their actions were committed
with the goal of impressing their friends in the gang.'
The only evidence presented at the sentencing hearing against defendant Matthews
was the hearsay testimony of an F.B.I. agent summarizing the statements made by other
members of Matthews's group of acquaintances. 2 Matthews's acquaintances told
the F.B.I. agent that they had seen him around the Crips and Matthews had bragged
about shooting Ms. Dittman.3 Matthews was not permitted to cross-examine the F.B.I.
agent or the friends who had made those statements.4 The judge found by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that Matthews belonged to the Crips and sentenced Matthews
to jail for an additional ten years.' Matthews had no notice of these charges at his trial
and no ability to plead his case to the jury.6 This Note questions the constitutionality
of the statute that sent Matthews to jail for an additional ten years: the Criminal Street
Gang Statute.7
The word "gang" evokes various images-from the mob and Don Corleone in the
Mario Puzo's The Godfather trilogy' to a group of urban teens with colored bandanas
hanging out on the street comer. Throughout history, people have formed groups
to satisfy the need to be part of a community and experience a sense of unity with
fellow citizens.9 The most common type of group is the ethnic group, which offers
' United States v. Matthews, 178 F.3d 295, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 944 (1999) (chronicling the events that led up to Matthews's trial and sentencing); see
18 U.S.C. § 521(b) (1994) (defining "criminal street gang").
2 Matthews, 178 F.3d at 303.
3Id.
4Id.
I Id. at 298.
6 Id. at 301.
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 521 (1994); Matthews, 178 F.3d at 298.
8 See The Godfather Website, http://www.thegodfather.com (last visited Aug. 11,2009).
9 See TIM DELANEY, AMERICAN STREET GANGs 1 (2005) (explaining that "by joining to-
gether in groups, individuals become a part of a whole... and share a sense of 'we-ness'...
that create[s] a community characterized by group loyalty"). See generally JANET FOSTER,
VILLAINS: CRIME AND COMMUNITY IN THE INNER CrrY (1990).
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"communality in language, a series of customs and symbols, rituals, and appear-
ance."'" Gangs tend to have an ethnic element." However, other gang associations
have formed to fill the same role an ethnic group once filled; a sense of community,
ability to belong, and an extended, or, in some cases, surrogate family. 12
Gangs exist in many forms, shapes, sizes, and organizational structures. Socio-
logically, gang structures have been divided into two main categories: nonstreet and
street gangs.'3 Although the focus of this Note will be on street gangs, it is beneficial
to briefly discuss nonstreet gangs to make a clear contrast. Motorcycle gangs, highly
organized crime, and gangsters such as Crips and Bloods, the Ku Klux Klan, Skinheads,
and prison gangs typically fall outside the traditional street gang definition. 4 No matter
the type, gangs generally create a sense of fear in the community resulting from their
criminal activity. Prosecutors on both the state and federal levels have attempted
many different approaches to battle the "gang problem."' 5 Correspondingly, on the
federal level, prosecutors have struggled to employ a useful tactic for those gangs that
fall outside of a highly organized gang.'6 The Federal Criminal Street Gang Statute
(CSGS) has been successfully employed only once at the federal district court level,' 7
but can be reworked to tackle the gang problem, without becoming subject to the
pitfalls of other attempts at gang legislation.
Currently, the CSGS functions as a sentencing enhancement to provide additional
punishment to those found by the sentencing body to have "participate[d] in a criminal
street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a continuing
series of offenses [including federal felonies of drug possession or violence]" and that
the convicted felon "intend[ed] to promote or further the felonious activities of the
criminal street gang or maintain or increase his or her position in the gang," and have
been "convicted in the past 5 years [of various offenses listed in the statute]."' 8 Al-
though not frequently used since its enactment in 1994, the statute still functions within
the United States Code as an option for prosecutors in their fight against gang crime. "
10 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 1 (quoting EUGENE E. RoosENs, CREATING ETHNICITY
(1989)).
11 Id.
12 Id.
' See id. at 13.
14 See id. at 13-27.
' See infra Part I.C for more background on the types of laws prosecutors have attempted
to employ to end gang violence.
6 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), discussed infra Part V, has
been useful in fighting large, centrally organized syndicated gangs, but has been near useless
in battling the smaller disjointed street gangs that are the topic of this Note.
'" See United States v. Matthews, 178 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
944 (1999); United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
938 (2003) (involving a successful charge of CSGS in the sentencing phase, leading to a sen-
tence enhancement for Matthews which was upheld on appeal twice by the Fifth Circuit).
18 18 U.S.C. § 521(d) (1994).
'9 See id.
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The CSGS is on a collision course, however, with the Supreme Court's current
standards for sentencing enhancements. Apprendi v. New Jersey was decided in 2000
and directly impacted the landscape for all statutes currently operating as sentencing
enhancements.2" The facts of Apprendi revolve around a New Jersey hate crime
statute which enhanced penalties for those believed to contain the necessary purpose
to engage in a hate crime.2 The Supreme Court in Apprendi overturned the convic-
tion, ruling that the Constitution requires that any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior con-
viction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.22 The
New Jersey Hate Crime enhancement functioned in the same way that the CSGS
functions, as a sentencing enhancement. The Court has yet to address the constitu-
tionality of the CSGS. It has been acknowledged by at least one court that Apprendi
may apply to the CSGS, and render it unconstitutional.23
Although Apprendi's application to the CSGS may render it unconstitutional, the
CSGS can still be resurrected. Both law enforcement and potential defendants deserve
a workable federal statute that will serve as a useful tool for prosecutors in the fight
to curb the widespread, national surge of gangs and gang violence, while defendants
are constitutionally entitled to a statute that provides them with fair notice of the
charges against them,24 and properly preserves due process.25
The focus of the remainder of this Note will examine the law surrounding the
CSGS. The CSGS currently operates as a sentencing enhancement that is in violation
of the Due Process Clause in the wake ofApprendi v. New Jersey. Although attempts
have been made to reform this statute, all have failed, and this statute stands as an
operative but unused tool in the arsenal against gang violence. This Note advocates
for the return of a competent, functional legislative option on the federal level that
is both useful and properly protects citizen rights. Through amending and molding the
CSGS into a substantive crime which must be pled in the indictment and proven to the
jury, the CSGS will become a useful option for federal prosecutors while affording
the proper Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to those accused of gang violence.
To address this topic thoroughly, this Note will begin by providing background
on criminal street gangs and examples of various jurisdictions' attempts at fighting
the growing gang problem. In Part II, this Note will analyze the elements of the
current CSGS. Part III will analyze the single jurisdiction which has attempted to
employ the CSGS as a sentencing enhancement.26 This part will also discuss more
20 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
21 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 2000) (repealed 2001).
22 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474-97.
23 See infra Part III (discussing the constitutionality of the CSGS).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (granting the right to a trial byjury and fair notice of the charges
against the defendant).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (federally guaranteed due process); U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1
(requiring due process be made applicable to state statutes through the Fourteenth Amendment).
26 See infra Part III (discussing Matthews I and I]).
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thoroughly the holding in Apprendi and the effect on sentencing enhancements in the
wake of Apprendi, focusing primarily on the CSGS and will conclude that the current
CSGS is unconstitutional. Part IV will discuss recent attempts to address the inef-
fectiveness of the current CSGS through proposed legislation in both the House and
Senate. Three large bills have been sent to committees in the House of the 110th
Congress, but have died upon the commencement of the 111 th Congress.27 This
Note will address briefly how each of these bills sought to alter the CSGS and why
none of them would have fully addressed the constitutional issues. This discussion
will lead into an original proposal, in Part V, for a bill to address the shortcomings of
the CSGS. The current Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) stat-
ute has been utilized successfully against many large scale nationally syndicated gangs
and can provide valuable insight into effectively addressing gang-related problems. 8
Finally, Part VI will return to Apprendi and outline why this Note's proposal will be
constitutional and effective against gang members whether they are first time offen-
ders who pose a real threat to the community or repeat offenders with significant
criminal histories.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: BACKGROUND
A. The World of Gangs
1. Motorcycle Gangs
Motorcycle gangs, such as the Hell's Angels and Pagan Outlaws, object strongly
to being considered gangs and believe they should be exempt from all anti-gang legis-
lation or restraints. 29 The founder of Hell's Angels, Ralph "Sonny" Barger, gave rea-
sons for starting the gang which closely parallel those of other organized groupings:
"We didn't stand for anything. It was just something to belong to .... It was all about
belonging to a group of people just like you."'30 Although Hell's Angels members dis-
like being associated with the term "gang," they do possess many characteristics of
gangs, including a unifying name, symbol, and members who participate in group
(often illegal) activities.3' As writer Hunter S. Thompson chronicled, Hell's Angels
is not only involved in legal recreational activities and promoting brotherhood, but
they "swap girls, drugs and motorcycles '3 2 and members have been frequentlyjailed
27 See Anti-Gang Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 3150, 110th Cong. (2007); Fighting
Gangs and Empowering Youth Act of 2007, H.R. 1692, 110th Cong. (2007); Gang Abatement
and Prevention Act of 2007, S.456, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by Senate, Sept. 21,2007).
28 See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).
29 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 14.
30 RALPH "SONNY" BARGER, HELL'S ANGEL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SONNY BARGER
AND THE HELL'S ANGELS MOTORCYCLE CLUB 21 (2000).
"' See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 15.
32 HUNTER S. THOMPSON, HELL'S ANGELS: A STRANGE AND TERRIBLE SAGA 25 (1966).
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for possession of "narcotics and marijuana, oftentimes with the intent to sell."'33
Although motorcycle gangs' criminal activity is similar to that of street gangs, the
difference is seen in the structure of the group. Barger created a highly structured
and well-organized gang.34 This high level of organization leads to the durability and
recognizability of Hell's Angels and other well-known biker gangs.35 Barger, himself,
created weekly meetings for each chartered group, established himself as the man
who would handle any problems within the group, and acted as liaison between the
group and any outside problems.36 The typical street gang is not highly organized and
usually does not have an easily identifiable leader such as Barger.
2. Organized Crime or Mafia
The Mafia is a recognizable symbol of this category of nonstreet gang. The Crips
and Bloods are included in this category as "national super gangs" because of their
highly organized and multilayered structure.37 The similarity in criminal activity is
the cohesive factor, which places these groups under the same category and differen-
tiates them from street gangs. Organized crime is a distinct category of crime defined
by the Federal Task Force on Organized Crime:
Organized crime includes any group of individuals whose primary
activity involves violating criminal laws to seek illegal profits and
power by engaging in racketeering activities and, when appropri-
ate, engaging in intricate financial manipulations.... Accord-
ingly, the perpetrators of organized crime may include corrupt
business executives, members of the professions, public officials,
or any occupational group, in addition to the conventional, racke-
teer element.38
This definition is broad and may encompass many gang types; however, the key con-
cept is that the gangs falling under the definition of organized crime are engaged in
33 DELANEY, supra note 9, at 15. Drug offenses are not the only crimes motorcycle gangs
commit. Aggravated assaults, theft, and drug and alcohol related offenses are frequent charges
on motorcycle gang members' records. Id at 16.
34 Id. at 16 ("The structure of the Hell's Angels is similar to that of a business or
corporation.").
1 Id. at 15.
36 Id. at 16. See generally BARGER, supra note 30 (describing himself throughout the
autobiography as the undisputed head of the Hell's Angels).
3' DELANEY, supra note 9, at 17.
38 DELANEY, supra note 9, at 17-18 (quoting NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 213-15 (1976)) (discussing the importance of clearly differ-
entiating organized crime from the kind of crime that criminal street gangs generally commit
to draw a distinction between the types of gangs).
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sophisticated activity.39 The goal of much of this activity is financial gain, although the
methods used to achieve this gain are corruption and the use or threat of violence.
40
3. Ku Klux Klan and Skinheads
The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and the Skinheads are included among gangs that are
less organized but are still dangerous, nationally well-known, and have common iden-
tifying characteristics. 4 ' Both of these gangs derive their identities from their ethnic-
ity and history.42 Each of these gangs is organized around the ideology of hate.43
They differ from street gangs in that they do not occupy a common neighborhood, or
"turf," but are identifiable to one another and other community members by tattoos,
symbols, and a rhetoric of hatred.44 Both the KKK and various skinhead organiza-
tions can be found in many states, and the skinhead movement is present in Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and Germany.45 Each of these groups operate as "cells" that
have minimal contact with other cells, but these cells share similar belief structures
and ideology in violence which makes each of these groups akin to smaller gangs
throughout the United States.46
'9 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 18.
40 See generally WILLIAM CHAMBLISS & ROBERT SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND POWER
(2d ed. 1982).
41 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 20 (discussing how different organizations relate to one
another).
42 For a more in-depth examination of the history of the KKK, see ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DIsuNrTING OF AMERICA (1992). The origin of the KKK can be
traced to the first charter in Pulaski, Tennessee, where in May 1866 the KKK formed to resist
post-Civil War Reconstruction and promote white supremacy. DELANEY, supra note 9, at 20.
Also, for a more in-depth examination of the history of the Skinheads, see MARK HAMM,
AMERICAN SKINHEADS: THE CRIMINOLOGY & CONTROL OF HATE CRIME (1993); JACK B.
MOORE, SKINHEADS SHAVED FOR BATTLE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN SKINHEADS
(1993). Skinheads have their roots in post-World War II Britain and began as groups of teen-
age men who were rebelling against society. MOORE, supra at 19. It was not until the 1970s
that the predecessor groups to the Skinheads formed an alliance with the British National Front,
an organization that promoted racist beliefs. Id. at 46. In the early 1980s, the Skinheads began
to form groups in the United States, complete with the swastika symbol and violence against
any non-whites. Id. at 64-65.
4' For the stated goals of the Ku Klux Klan, see The Knights Party, http://www.kkk.bz/
ourgoal.htm.
44 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 21-22 (discussing the Klan's current hatred rhetoric
regarding its "ideal" society).
41 Id. at 21 (describing the presence of the KKK in modem America); id. at 26-27
(describing the presence of skinhead subculture throughout the world).
" Id. at 25 (citing Jim Mulvaney, 'Skinhead' Founder Renounces His Ties, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Aug. 1, 1993).
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4. Prison Gangs
Prison gangs bear mention because they are commonly known gangs that include
many members and have the capacity for great violence similar to the other gangs in
this section." Prison gangs were formed mostly by members of street gangs who were
locked up and continued their illegal group activities behind bars.48 Prison gangs are
obviously nonstreet because they operate exclusively behind bars. With the occa-
sional exception which is outside the scope of this Note, prison gangs typically do not
cause problems for law enforcement outside of prison walls.49
5. Street Gangs
Defining a street gang is a difficult problem due to various levels of organization
each gang may possess, their types of activities (both legal and illegal), and where
these gangs live and loiter. Malcolm Klein and Cheryl Maxson attempted to provide
a working definition developed through their research on gangs: "A street gang is any
durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of its
group identity."5 Although broad, this definition incorporates certain elements that
both authors felt were present in all street gangs: (1) durability; (2) street-oriented;
(3) youth; (4) illegal; and (5) identity.5
Durability is a bit vague, but "an existence of several months can be used as a
guideline. 5 2 Durability refers to groups that exist as a cohesive identifiable gang
regardless of a turnover in membership. 3 Although street-oriented seems obvious,
it implies "spending a lot of group time outside home, work, and school-often
on streets, in malls, in parks, in cars," and around housing projects or neighborhood
squares.14 Street gangs are overwhelmingly youth-oriented. Some gangs include
members into their late twenties or early thirties, but the majority of the membership
is comprised of those in their mid-adolescence into their early twenties." To be con-
sidered a street gang, Klein and Maxson's definition suggests that a group must be
engaged in delinquent or criminal activities, not simply bothersome to the surrounding
47 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 27.
48 See id. at 27-34 (discussing history of prison gangs beginning in 1950 with the Gypsy
Jokers and growing to include dangerous gangs today such as La Eme (Mexican Mafia),
Aryan Brotherhood, Neta, Black Guerrilla Family, and La Nuestra Familia).
49 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 27.
so MALcOLM W. KLEIN & CHERYL L. MAXSON, STREET GANG PATTERNS AND POLICIES
4 (2006).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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citizens.56 Finally, identity is an important element common among all types of gangs,
not simply street gangs. An identity must be formed for the group itself; it cannot
simply adopt the identity of an individual or leader.57 Usually groups use not only
names but colors, symbols, tattoos, and hand signals to identify their particular gang.5
The difficulty of defining "street gang" is that they come in many different orga-
nizational structures.5 9 Many stereotypes abound when one considers what a gang
member looks like, but not all of these are accurate and able to be included in the defi-
nition.' For the purposes of this Note, the general definition, including the element of
illegality, will suffice as a starting point for conceptualizing a criminal street gang.
B. Gang Crime and Community Fear
Gangs exist in all fifty states, stretch throughout all socioeconomic classes and
racial groups, and cause disruption and crime everyday in many communities. 6' Be-
cause different cities and law enforcement agencies define a "gang" differently, statis-
tics on exactly how many gangs exist are difficult to gather and it is difficult to assess
the accuracy of these statistics.62 The 2006 National Youth Gang Survey (NYGS),
published in 2008, reported that there are approximately 785,000 active gang mem-
bers and about 26,500 active, identifiable gang operations in the United States.63 The
surveyed jurisdictions reported a rise across all major gang-related criminal activity
16 KLEIN & MAXSON, supra note 50, at 4.
57 Id.
58 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 8-10. Interestingly, some gangs have not only adopted
the stereotypical tattoos or colored bandanas that come to mind when one thinks of gang mem-
bers, but also gangs have adopted types or brands of clothing. Id. at 10. For instance, a Duke
University sweatshirt is worn by many members of the Gangster Disciples of Chicago. They
interpret DUKE to stand for Disciples Utilizing Knowledge Everyday. Id. Also, Calvin Klein
jeans with the logo CK may be too dangerous to wear in some Los Angeles neighborhoods
as it can be interpreted by gangs as standing for "Crip Killers" when worn by the rival gang,
the Bloods. Id. (citing Melissa Roth, Posse Paraphernalia, GEORGE MAGAZINE, Mar. 1998).
'9 See id. at 7-8 (outlining states' difficulties in crafting anti-gang statutes due to their
inability to capture different organizational structures in the statutes' definition section).
60 See id, at 10-11 (describing the many gang stereotypes and the reality of gang members
through the use of examples, including the contrast of the stereotype of gangs existing only in
low income urban areas with gangs in small towns and Native American reservations).
61 Id. at 12.
62 Id. For instance, in Syracuse, New York, the Police Department denied that there were
active gangs in the city because of the city's narrow definition of a gang. See id In 2002, the
Police Chief finally acknowledged gang activity and created a task force within the department
to address gang issues. Id.
63 ARLEN EGLEY, JR., & CHRISTINA E. O'DONNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HIGHLIGHTS
OF THE 2006 NATIONAL YOUTH GANG SURVEY 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles l
ojjdp/fs200805.pdf.
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categories. Aggravated assault rose approximately fifty-five percent, while drug sales,
robbery, theft, burglary, and auto theft all rose upwards of thirty percent.'
Gangs have been a segment of the American social landscape since its inception,
but the 1970s through the present mark what some have called "an epidemic" in gang
proliferation and violence.65 In this new era, gangs have become more diversified
in size and structure, with both large street gangs and smaller, more localized street
gangs.66 Given the growth of street gangs, the number of new members, and the rise
in violent crime that stems from these gang activities, it is understandable why police
and communities have placed a high priority on fighting the spread of gangs.
C. Local Solutions: Task Forces, Check Points, and Injunctions
Communities have attempted to solve the gang problem in many different ways,
from the typical procedures to the more creative. As discussed briefly above, many
cities formed gang task forces to target and alleviate gang-related violence. 67 Federal
agencies have also attempted to do their part. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) formed a Violent Gang Task Force to "focus the INS's attention not on
general immigration enforcement, but on the use of immigration law as a means of
assisting local anti-gang activity. 68 Cities and towns have begun to utilize antiloiter-
ing laws and injunctions as both criminal and civil supplements to formal law enforce-
ment.69 Although California has long utilized antiloitering laws,7" the question of
' Id. at 2, fig. 1.
65 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 59-60 (chronicling the change from primarily defense-
oriented gangs concerned with protecting their members to offensive gangs who assertively,
and often violently, seek larger territories, a bigger piece of illegal activity, and have spread
to rural areas); see also Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances after City of Chicago v.
Morales: The Intersection ofRace, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal
Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 101, 101-05 (2002) (describing the rise of gangs in recent decades
and the constitutionality of society's attempts to control gang violence).
66 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 60 (calling attention to the large "brand name" gangs well-
known to the public that have grown considerably in the wake of the Vietnam War creating
"super gangs," the preeminent being Los Angeles's Bloods and Crips as well as Chicago's
Vice Lords, Latin Kings, Latin Disciples, and Black Gangster Disciples); see also Scott H.
Decker & G. David Curry, Gangs, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 755,756
(David Levinson, ed., 2002) (noting that both large and smaller gangs cause similar amounts
of chaos due to the large availability of "automobiles and firearms" after the Vietnam War).
67 See DELANEY, supra note 9, at 254.
68 Jennifer M. Chac6n, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
"Criminal Street Gang Member, " 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 325 (2007).
69 Eva Rosen & Sudhir Venkatesh, Legal Innovation and the Control of Gang Behavior,
3 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 255, 266-67 (2007).
70 See ACLU FOUNDATION OF S. CAL., FALSE PREMISE/FALSE PROMISE: THE BLYTHE
STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 1 (1997), available at http://www.streetgangs
.com/injunctions/topics/blythereport.pdf (last visited May 28, 2009). Officials claimed the
injunction was "the nation's first legal offensive against a street gang." Id.
258 [Vol. 18:249
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the constitutionality of antiloitering laws took center stage in City of Chicago v.
Morales.71 The City of Chicago enacted an ordinance in 1992 prohibiting identifiable
gang members from loitering in a public place.72 The ordinance had provisions to
enforce this act through arrest, a fine, or imprisonment for not more than six months
and a requirement of community service for the purpose of curbing an "escalation of
violent and drug related crimes."73 The Supreme Court struck down this particular
statute as unconstitutionally vague on the grounds that the statute denied due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, partly on the grounds that the statute
"fail[ed] to notify individuals what conduct is prohibited, and it encourage[d] arbi-
trary and capricious enforcement by police. 74
Although the Court struck down the statute in Morales, Justice Stevens's major-
ity opinion is narrowly worded such that, while finding the statute a violation of due
process, the statute does not violate the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech, expression, or freedom of association.75 The majority found it unconstitu-
tional on its face because it was vague and required no mens rea requirement despite
potential criminal consequences. 76 The Court may have struck down the Chicago
statute in Morales, but it remains unclear whether a city may constitutionally regu-
late, either criminally or civilly, gang activity through more concretely authored anti-
loitering statutes.77
Communities across the country have continued to pursue alternative legislation
to achieve results in the fight against gang violence in the wake of Morales.8 At the
end of June 2008, Florida Governor Charlie Crist joined the ranks of other public
officials when he signed a bill which permitted communities to enact civil injunctions
against any of the approximately 1,500 gangs that claim residence in the state.79 Other
states to take such civil action against gangs include Massachusetts, Texas, Illinois
(under a redesigned civil injunction remedy), and Minnesota."° Each injunction varies
slightly from its counterparts, but all "seek a court order declaring the gang's public
behavior a nuisance in order to ask for limitations on their activity. 8' The limitations
usually take the form of establishing curfews, prohibiting known gang apparel, and
71 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
7 Id. at 45-46.
7 Id. at 46.
74 Id. at 45-46, 49-50.
71 Id. at 53.
76 Id. at 55.
71 Id. ("There is no need, however, to decide whether the impact of the Chicago ordinance
on constitutionally protected liberty alone would suffice to support a facial challenge under
the overbreadth doctrine.").
78 See Rosen & Venkatesh, supra note 69, at 265.
7 Stefanie Frith, Cities Try Wrangling Gangs with CivilSuits, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 8,2008,
at 2A, available athttp:/Avww.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-07-ganginjunctionsN.htm.
8o Id.
81 Id.
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flashing gang signs.8' Law enforcement usually views these injunctions as a positive
tool to keep gangs from meeting and creating fear in the surrounding community."
There is a strong risk, however, that these civil statutes may unconstitutionally
limit rights. The American Civil Liberties Union, and others, fear that "the injunctions
place prohibitions on lawful activity, including the right to gather publicly" and "[i]t
criminalizes ordinary daily activity."" Opponents to civil remedies criticize injunc-
tions for their vagueness, and they attempt to stop normal non-criminal activity, such
as two friends conversing on the street comer or two brothers having lunch together
in the park. 5 Also widely criticized is the threshold issue of law enforcement's ability
to determine who is a gang member and who is not.86 It, however, remains to been
seen how the Supreme Court will ultimately view civil gang injunctions and other
efforts at curbing gang activity.87 Currently, the federal legislative focus has been
the Criminal Street Gang Statute.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Jeffrey Grogger, The Effects of Civil Gang Injunctions on Reported Violent
Crime: Evidencefrom Los Angeles County, 45 J.L. & ECON. 69 (2002) (reporting the findings
of a statistical study evaluating the effectiveness of civil gang injunctions in L.A. County).
Dr. Grogger found that "8 years' worth of data drawn from four law enforcement jurisdictions,
suggest that civil gang injunctions lead the rate of violent crimes to decrease" roughly five
to ten percent, most prevalently in assault crimes. Id. at 89.
84 See Frith, supra note 79.
85 Id.
86 See Pldcido G. G6mez, It is Not So Simply Because an Expert Says It is So: The
Reliability of Gang Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal Street Gangs:
Pushing the Limits of Texas Rule of Evidence 702, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 581, 583 (2003)
(criticizing in detail the danger of allowing law enforcement officers to act as experts on
gang membership and why the practice may lead to discriminatory and overbroad use of civil
gang injunctions).
87 Civil gang injunctions are only one of a few creative methods communities have found
to supplement traditional law enforcement tactics. This author personally witnessed the
events in June and July of 2008, when District of Columbia Police Chief Cathy L. Lanier insti-
tuted controversial checkpoints in D.C.'s violence-tom Trinidad neighborhood. All Things
Considered, D.C. Police Use Radical Tactic to Combat Homicides (National Public Radio
broadcast June 11, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
91379525 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). These checkpoints were designed to close off Trinidad
streets after dark to limit access to the geographic area. Police stopped each car in the neighbor-
hood and asked for identification. Id. Although the checkpoints created nine days of peace in
a neighborhood that had seen an extreme escalation in violence, the District was sued by the
Partnership for Civil Justice claiming that the checkpoints violated protected constitutional
liberty. See DeNeen L. Brown, Checkpoints: They Make You Stop and Think, WASH. POST,
July 28,2008, at C 1; Courtland Milloy, A Street Corner Analysis ofD. C. Crime, WASH. POST,
July 23, 2008, at B 1. The District of Columbia Circuit overturned a municipal court decision
declaring the checkpoints constitutional. Mills v. Dist. ofColumbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1306 (D.C.
Cir. 2009). In a unanimous ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "there is no... constitu-
tionally sound bar in the NSZ checkpoint program. It is apparent that appellants' constitutional
rights are violated." Mills, 571 F.3d at 1312.
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I. THE FEDERAL LEVEL: WHAT IS THE CRIMINAL STREET GANG STATUTE?
At the federal level, legislation, either new or amended, is a tool lawmakers utilize
prolifically to aid the fight against crime. Anti-gang legislation is no different. Injunc-
tions discussed in Part I.C are a legislative creation on the state level, but federally,
Congress has attempted to address the national gang problem on a larger scale. One
of the legislative tools available to federal prosecutors is the Federal Criminal Street
Gang Statute (CSGS).88
The CSGS was passed in 1994 as a sentencing enhancement for criminal defen-
dants found to be members of a criminal street gang.8 9 Until the most recent decade,
sentencing enhancements were treated differently by federal courts than substantive
crimes.90 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were established in 1984 by the United
States Sentencing Commission to provide sentencing recommendations for federal
convictions. 9 Recommendations may be a mischaracterization of the guidelines in
the mid- 1 990s, as they were often criticized for being "overly rigid, complicated and
unfair."'92 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines invested wide discretion in trial judges
during the sentencing phase and permitted structured "departures" from the indicated
sentencing guidelines.93 The CSGS is a federally enacted "departure" from the orig-
inal guidelines, permitting sentencing judges to enhance sentencing for another crime
post-conviction if the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant
to be a member of a criminal street gang.'
88 18 U.S.C. § 521(2006).
89 Id.
90 See David C. Holman, Note, Death by a Thousand Cases: Afier Booker, Rita, and Gall,
the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 WM. &MARY L. REV. 267 (2008) (discuss-
ing the current issues surrounding sentencing enhancements). Holman discusses the evolution
of sentencing guidelines in the wider context ofthe Federal Sentencing Guidelines from their
inception in 1984 through 2000, where they mechanically "stripped the sentencing judge of
most of his discretion" and applied a formula for a sentence. Id. at 271-73.
91 See id. at 271; see also Lisa Stansky, Breaking Up Prison Gridlock, 82 A.B.A.J. 70
(reviewing the state of the federal sentencing guidelines pre-Apprendi).
92 Stansky, supra note 91, at 70-71 (noting that the increase of the prison population and
the violence that stemmed from over crowding could trace its roots to the establishment of
the sentencing guidelines).
9' David 0. Stewart, One More Legacy ofRodney King: US. Supreme Court Ruling Affirms
Trial Court Discretion in Sentencing, 82 A.B.A.J. 44 (discussing the procedural aftermath of
Koon v. United States and the affirmance of extreme deference to the trial court in sentencing
matters); see also United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), rehearing en banc
denied, 45 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ('The panel's encroachment on
district court discretion epitomizes the mechanical and inflexible approach to sentencing...
the [Sentencing] Guidelines themselves represent."), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
9' See Gary R. Brown, Less Bark, More Bite: Fixing the Criminal Street Gang
Enhancement, 16 FED. SENT'G REp. 148 (2003).
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The CSGS permits sentencing judges to employ an upward departure from federal
guidelines for any "act ofjuvenile delinquency involving a violent or controlled sub-
stances felony." 5 After conviction by ajury or bench trial of any violent or controlled
substance felony, a sentencing judge may increase the substantive offense's sentence
by up to ten years under certain conditions.96 It is left to the judge's discretion to find
that the defendant before him satisfies the requirements of § 521, namely that she
participated in a street gang with knowledge of crimes committed by other members
of the gang, intended to promote or further the crimes of the gang, or maintained or
increased her position in the gang by committing the substantive crime, and had at
least one prior conviction for a similar offense.9 7 Because the CSGS is a sentencing
enhancement and not a substantively charged crime, the prosecutor does not charge
the gang crimes or need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant partici-
pated for the benefit of the gang or with the intent to benefit the gang. The standard
of proof for sentencing is currently preponderance of the evidence.98 The CSGS is
operable for prosecutors to employ during the sentencing phase. It is rarely used,
however, perhaps due to its unconstitutionality when viewed in light of recent
Supreme Court rulings.99
III. THE CSGS's DUBIOUS CONSTITUTIONALITY
Although the CSGS has not been challenged directly in the United States Supreme
Court, recent decisions have shed light on the issue of sentencing enhancement statutes
in general, and the CSGS specifically. The Fifth Circuit is the only federal circuit
court to consider the constitutionality of the CSGS. The Fifth Circuit considered the
CSGS in two separate appeals stemming from the same criminal action."' The Fifth
Circuit considered the issue of the CSGS twice: once before Apprendi v. New Jersey
was decided, and again after Apprendi.'0 '
A. Round One: United States v. Matthews I
United States v. Matthews (Matthews 1) stems from an appeal from a conviction
of Matthews and his co-defendant, Cook, who attempted to carjack Terrie Dittman in
" 18 U.S.C. § 521 (a),(c) (1994) (adding conspiracy charges to the applicable substantive
crime).
96 Id. at (b).
97 Id. at (d).
98 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005) (finding that sentencing enhance-
ments based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard and never presented to a jury
were unconstitutional).
99 Id
"o See United States v. Matthews, 178 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
944 (1999); United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
938 (2003).
101 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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her driveway.10 2 Matthews and Cook were convicted of carjacking, conspiracy to
commit carjacking, and using a firearm during a crime of violence.'0 3 At the sen-
tencing hearing, Matthews's carjacking sentence was enhanced due to the serious
bodily injury inflicted on Ms. Dittman pursuant to a state statute. The court also
enhanced his conspiracy to commit carjacking sentence because it found that he had
committed the crime in furtherance of a criminal street gang under 18 U.S.C. § 521
(CSGS).' 4 Matthews appealed on several grounds, but most pertinent to this Note
is his appeal of the sentence enhancement handed down under the CSGS. The Fifth
Circuit found that the CSGS is a sentencing enhancement, not a substantive crime, and
it does not violate Matthews's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.105 They also found
no clear error in the court's findings during sentencing that Matthews was a member
of the Crips street gang."'
B. In the Interim: Apprendi v. New Jersey and A New Standard For Fifth and
Sixth Amendment Rights in Sentencing Enhancements
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear an appeal from a petitioner who
was found guilty of shooting into an African-American family's home while also
carrying an "antipersonnel bomb."'0 7 The New Jersey court found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence during a sentencing hearing that Petitioner acted as a result of
racial hatred and enhanced his sentence under a New Jersey hate crime statute.0 8 The
Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause required that a jury, on the basis of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, must find any fact, other than previous convictions,
that increases the maximum prison sentence.'0 9 Put another way, the Court found
102 Matthews, 178 F.3d at 297.
Id3 Idat 298.
104 Id.
05 Id. at 301-02 (reviewing 18 U.S.C. § 52 1's language, structure, subject matter, context
and history and finding it clear that the CSGS was a sentencing factor, not a substantive crime,
and therefore did not violate either Matthews's Fifth Amendment due process rights or his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and notice of the charges against him).
106 Id. at 302-03. During sentencing the government presented additional evidence in the
form of testimony from an F.B.I. agent acting as an expert on gangs. The agent testified that
Matthews was a member of the Crips, his co-defendant was also Crips-affiliated, Matthews
received the gun used to commit the crime from a fellow gang member, and Matthews bragged
about the carjacking to other gang members. Id.
07 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469-70 (2000). During the defendant's
interrogation he admitted that he did not know the occupants of the home, but "because they
are black in color he [did] not want them in the neighborhood." Id. at 469.
10' d. at 471.
'09 Id. at 486, 490 ("Constitutional limits exist to States' authority to define away facts
necessary to constitute a criminal offense and... a state scheme that keeps from the jury facts
that 'expos[e] [defendants] to greater or additional punishment' may raise serious constitu-
tional concern.") (internal citations omitted) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79, 88 (1986)).
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that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 The Court overruled New Jersey's sentence
for Petitioner and remanded."'
At first these broad statements seemed to indicate a widespread change in sen-
tencing procedures to conform sentencing to Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
protections discussed in Apprendi. This has not come to pass.1 2 In Ring v. Arizona,"3
United States v. Cotton,'14 and Harris v. United States,"5 the Court demonstrated
reluctance to extend Apprendi beyond its narrow holding. Particularly in Harris, in
which a fact used in sentencing was not pled or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Court did not require Harris's conviction to be overturned where ajudge
increased the defendant's minimum, as opposed to maximum, sentence by finding
the additional fact that Harris "brandish[ed]" his gun." 6 Although the decision was
5-4 in Harris, only four Justices signed the section of the opinion that parsed the
language of Apprendi to find a difference between increasing a statutory minimum
sentence and a maximum sentence. Justice Breyer, the fifth member, admitted that
he could not distinguish Apprendi v. New Jersey from Harris in terms of logic and
could not agree with the majority's opinion on the distinction.' The close decision
and the Court's reluctance to extend Apprendi made Apprendi's impact on judicial
sentencing increases uncertain at best." 1
8
110 Id. at490; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,243 n.6 (1999) ("[U]nder the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment, any fact . . . that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in the indictment, submitted to ajury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."). This
footnote in Jones seems to foreshadow the Court's official holding a year later in Apprendi.
..' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
112 See Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-land": Statutory
Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 380 (2002)
(quotingApprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that in the Spring 2002
Term, the Court agreed to hear three Apprendi-related cases and, in their wake, it appears that
Apprendi is not the 'watershed change' that the Apprendi dissenters feared")).
".. 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (determining Apprendi's effect on Arizona's capital sentencing
system).
114 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (discussing whether Apprendi requires an automatic reversal of
certain criminal convictions on appeal).
"' 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (discussing whether Apprendi protections should apply to facts
that increase a defendant's statutory minimum sentence).
116 Id. at 568. The Court went on to conclude that the "judicial finding ofbrandishing does
not evade the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." Id.
117 See Levine, supra note 112, at 381 (quoting Harris, 536 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
18 Id. at 382; see also Jess D. Mekeel, Note, Misnamed, Misapplied, and Misguided:
Clarifying the State of Sentencing Entrapment and Proposing a New Conception of the
Doctrine, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1583, 1593 (2006) (discussing the aftermath of
[Vol. 18:249
YOUR HONOR, I SEEN HIM WITH THAT GANG
The uncertainty of sentencing is compounded by United States v. Booker."9
The holding in Booker closely mirrors Apprendi discussed above, but Booker takes
the ruling one step further by slightly modifying the holding in Apprendi to fully
address the constitutionality of the Guidelines, an issue the Court declined to answer
in Apprendi 20 In Apprendi, the specific holding referred to the necessity to plead
charges and submit to a jury any findings that would enhance a sentence "beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum."' 21 The Apprendi Court declined to answer the ques-
tion of whether the Guidelines themselves were constitutional. 2 2 Booker revisited
this question and concluded that the Guidelines must be advisory to conform to the
Sixth Amendment.123 In this aspect, the Supreme Court appeared to reaffirm its hold-
ing through Booker and declare that the Constitution will not tolerate sentencing
enhancements that are not proven or submitted to a fact finder, such as would be the
case in the CSGS.' 24 The forcefulness of the Booker decision only contributed to the
uncertainty of how sentencing enhancements are to be treated by courts when con-
sidered in conjunction with the reluctance of the Court in cases such as Cotton, Ring,
and Harris.
To complete the picture of uncertainty, the Supreme Court most recently declined
to extend Apprendi beyond its narrow holding in Oregon v. Ice. 25 The Court con-
sidered Ice's appeal asserting his sentencing was unconstitutional under Apprendi v.
New Jersey, because an Oregon statute allowed the sentencing judge to impose a
consecutive sentence rather than a concurrent sentence when a "defendant is simul-
taneously sentenced for criminal offenses that do not arise from the same ... course
of conduct."' 26 In a five-to-four decision, the Court announced that in the present case,
the erosion of the jury's traditional role was not at stake, and therefore, the holding
of Apprendi was inapplicable, as was the Sixth Amendment's restriction on judge-
found facts. 127 The majority again reaffirmed its desire to maintain Apprendi as a
Harris and noting that many commentators have concluded that the role of mandatory mini-
mums have been augmented).
"' 543 U.S. 220 (2005). For a more complete discussion on constitutional controversy
surrounding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the wake of Booker, see Holman, supra
note 90.
120 Booker, 543 U.S. at 238.
121 Id. at 238 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
122 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 n.21 (2000).
123 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
124 Id. at 230 ("It is equally clear that the 'Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right
to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is
charged."' (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995))).
121 129 S. Ct 711; 555 U.S. __ (2009).
126 OR. REV. STAT. § 137.123(2) (2007).
127 Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 714-15; 555 U.S. at_; see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 308-09 (2004) (discussing the traditional role reserved for the jury and the necessity that
a judge not impose upon the jury's role).
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purely narrow holding, even over a strongly worded dissent. 2 ' In light of these
most recent holdings, the CSGS will not have to be dramatically altered to conform
to Apprendi. Primarily, the judge-found facts must not impede on the traditional jury
role contemplated in the Sixth Amendment. 29 The changes will be discussed more
substantively below in Part V.
C. The Lost Opportunity.: United States v. Matthews II
Matthews renewed his appeal, again on several grounds, and appeared a second
time before the Fifth Circuit.3 ' The second appeal, however, was decided after
Apprendi, but before any extensive insight from the Supreme Court on the scope of
the holding.13 ' On Matthews's second appeal, he again raised the issue of the con-
stitutionality of his sentencing enhancement for both the state carjacking enhance-
ment and the CSGS enhancement. 3 2 Matthews raised Apprendi as an intervening
change of law that would reduce his sentence by nullifying the sentence enhance-
ment. 133 Before reaching conclusions on the effect of Apprendi on the enhancements,
the court addressed a procedural issue raised by Matthews, namely whether "doc-
trine of law of the case permitted the district court to reconsider and vacate its § 521
enhancement of his conspiracy sentence and prohibited the court from enhancing his
carjacking sentence under § 521 .""' The court found that it was permitted to review
the sentencing for the CSGS enhancement, but Apprendi did not mandate either
sentencing enhancement review. 35 The court reviewed the CSGS enhancement and
found that Apprendi did not categorically change the outcome. 136 The court read
Apprendi's holding to say "[i]f a fact increases the statutory maximum penalty, it
must be pleaded in the indictment and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
regardless of whether Congress intended the fact to be a 'sentencing factor' or an
12 Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 722; 555 U.S. at____ (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, the
Court abandons its effort to provide analytic support for its decision .... The protection of
the Sixth Amendment does not turn on this Court's opinion of whether an alternative scheme
is good policy .... The right to trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a given,
and all legislative policymaking... must work within the confines of that reality.").
129 See supra note 127.
130 United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 938
(2003).
13' Apprendi v. New Jersey was decided in late 2000. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000). Matthews H oral arguments were held in early 2002. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652
(5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 938 (2003). The Supreme Court opinions clarifying
Apprendi were not decided until late 2002.
'32 See Matthews, 312 F.3d at 656.
'.. Id. (asking the court to rule on the "validity, after Apprendi, ofa § 521 enhancement based
on facts not pleaded in the indictment and not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt").
134 Id.
131 Id. at 657-58.
136 Id. at 661.
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'element."" 37 Because the district court (1) found the facts of the CSGS by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) did not
plead the facts of CSGS in the indictment, the district court was in error.13 The Fifth
Circuit, however, did "not conclude that § 521 is unconstitutional, but only that
Apprendi require[d] the facts" for the basis of the CSGS to be charged in the indict-
ment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'39 The court then
applied a harmless error analysis and found that the error was harmless. 4 '
The short-shrift treatment that the Fifth Circuit gave to the discussion of the
sentencing enhancement's constitutionality is curious considering that Apprendi
seemingly would have had a large impact on at least ten additional years to which
Matthews was sentenced.' Some scholars have suggested a few reasons for this,
including the Fifth Circuit's desire to apply a limited resentencing approach designed
to limit the number of issues reviewed on appeal so as to further judicial economy and
display reluctance to give the criminal defendant a "second bite at the apple."'42 The
Matthews II court's conclusion that a substantial violation of Matthews's constitu-
tional rights constituted only harmless error could be attributed to the law-of-the-case
doctrine, or simply a desire to limit the impact of Apprendi on other pending cases. '43
Regardless of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the question of the CSGS and its dubious
constitutionality has yet to be directly addressed through a facial challenge.
Each of these developments causes one to doubt the constitutionality of § 521.
Although Matthews II concluded that the sentencing enhancement's applicability in
his case was unconstitutional, the court stopped short of suggesting that § 521, on its
face, was unconstitutional.'" Currently, however, § 521 is not widely used to battle
street gang violence, and rightfully so given its dubious constitutionality. In an attempt
to provide workable tools in the war on crime, the following section reviews Congress's
three most recent attempts to amend or supplement § 521 and concludes that none of
these bills would successfully address the street gang problem.
IV. A CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF A PROBLEM
During the 1 10th Congress, three bills were presented that would have directly
affected § 521 if passed. Upon the commencement of the 111 th Congress, however,
... Id. at 663.
' Id. at 664.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 665-67.
41 Id. at 656.
142 See Tracy Friddle & Jon M. Sands, "Don't Think Twice, It's All Right": Remands,
Federal Sentencing Guidelines & the Protect Act-A Radical "Departure"?, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 527, 537 (2004) (quoting United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
141 See id. at 537-38 (The law-of-the-case doctrine refers to a "court's reluctance to reopen
a ruling it has already made or one court's reluctance to revisit a ruling made by another.").
144 Matthews, 312 U.S. at 664.
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these bills were presumed dead in committee. This section will examine why the bills,
had they become law, would have unsuccessfully amended the CSGS.
A. Fighting Gangs and Empowering Youth Act of 2007145
This large bill sought to prevent youth gang crime while providing economic
stimulation and education funding to urban, specifically gang ridden, communities."
For the purposes of this Note, the amendment to § 521 is the most relevant section of
this bill. 47 It was structured much like other legislation discussed below. H.R. 1692
included predicate crimes, enhanced punishment for two or more predicate crimes, and
penalties for committing a predicate gang crime with intent and knowledge of further-
ing the gang through the commission of the crime, as well as making it a crime to
recruit or encourage someone to join a criminal street gang.14 The complexity of this
bill is difficult to follow and would present a barrier to a prosecutor.
B. Anti-Gang Enforcement Act of2007149
This proposed legislation would have amended the current Criminal Street Gang
Statute by adding to its breadth. 50 The proposed bill included prohibited acts (includ-
ing interstate commerce activities),' a new penalties section for violating section (a),
defined predicate gang crimes, and made it a crime to participate in a criminal street
gang by committing two or more of the predicate crimes with knowledge and purpose
of aiding the gang.5 2 Penalties were added to punish committing a predicate crime as
a member of a gang with knowledge and purpose that it was in furtherance of a gang,'53
a forfeiture provision, '14 and an additional section that increased penalties for violent
crimes in furtherance of a criminal street gang. 15 This bill was introduced in the
House on July 24, 2007, and referred to the Judiciary, Energy and Commerce, Health,
Crime and Terrorism, and Homeland Security Committees where it died.
145 H.R. 1692, 110th Cong. (2007).
146 Id.
147 Id. § 301.
148 Id. (making the commission of a large range of crimes, including any felony punishable
by more than one year, coupled with the finding that a person is in gang an additional crime).
149 H.R. 3150, 110th Cong. (2007).
"0 Id. § 2 ("Chapter 26 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
[of§ 521] the following: § 522 .... ").
'' Id. § 2(a) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to use any facility in, or travel in,
interstate or foreign commerce.. .
152 Id. § 3.
153 Id. § 3(b).
15 Id. § 3(d).
155 Id. § 4(a) ("§ 523. Violent crimes in furtherance or in aid of a criminal street gang.").
[Vol. 18:249
YOUR HONOR, I SEEN HIM WITH THAT GANG
C. Gang Abatement and Prevention Act of 2007156
Although not a proposed amendment to the CSGS, 157 this proposed bill would
become operable upon a conviction utilizing § 521 and would have added a forfeiture
provision to what is currently in § 52 1.58 Section 215 of the proposed act would per-
mit Congress to review sentencing guidelines and policies to conform to Title 18 
59
Senate Bill 456 was introduced to the Senate in January 2007, passed in the Senate
on September 21, 2007, and was referred to the House on October 17, 2007. It has
since been in the Committee on Healthy Families and Communities.
Each one of the above bills contained sections that would provide valuable tools
to law enforcement. Not one of these bills, however, provided a simple, workable
framework for law enforcement. The flaws of these bills are numerous and include
a lack of simplicity, no defined elements, and no sociologically based definition of
a street gang, each of which are core necessities in a CSGS. To provide a clear and
usable constitutional tool for law enforcement and prosecutors, a new bill must meet
these core objectives. Only a new model CSGS would accomplish both the con-
stitutionality and simplicity needed to benefit both law enforcement and criminal
defendants.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE: RICO AND A MODEL CSGS
The large, convoluted bills discussed above have some virtues, but they are also
riddled with problems that would render each bill unusable and not easily managed
by prosecutors or easily understood by defendants. Primarily, the length and com-
plexity of most of the above bills are imposing and present an initial hurdle to any
time-squeezed prosecutor. Simplicity is crucial for the prosecutor's understanding,
ability to convey the charges to ajury, and ability to ensure criminal defendants' com-
prehension. A model CSGS should contain clearly defined elements including a more
precise definition section to determine who is considered "in the gang" and those
who may have committed crimes, but may not have related to gang violence. 6 '
"56 S. 456, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by Senate, Sept. 21, 2007).
157 Id.
158 Id. § 525 ("A person who is convicted of a violation of this chapter shall forfeit to the
United States .... ").
9 Id. § 215 ("Amendment of Sentencing Guidelines"... "In carrying out this section,
the United States Sentencing Commission shall-(1) establish new guidelines.., in order
to implement new or revised criminal offenses under this title and the amendments made by
this title .... ).
160 See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 83-91 (2005) (relating
sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh's venture into the world of the Black Gangster Disciple Nation
in Chicago, and stating that gangs hire "mercenary fighters" who are actually nonmembers
of a gang, but are hired by the gang to aid the gang in turf wars).
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Secondly, although the bills discussed above attempt to craft § 521 from a sentenc-
ing enhancement into a substantive crime, § 521 needs to be more clearly amended to
rectify the constitutional challenge based on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
presented byApprendi. Also, easily understood elements must be delineated to ensure
the proper notice to the criminal defendant, and to aid the prosecutor in conveying
their message to the jury.
Finally, additional sections must be added, including a forfeiture provision to
target a gang's economic incentives and an interstate commerce jurisdictional hook
to aid federal courts in invoking jurisdiction easily, as well as aid in law enforcement
coordination. Additionally, a newly-crafted bill should attempt to understand why
youth join criminal street gangs, and target those incentives.' 6 ' To refocus the dis-
cussion, this Note suggests that RICO, 62 a highly successful tool used to combat
organized crime, should be examined by legislators in crafting legislation that would
target lesser organized criminal street gangs, while still conforming to Apprendi and
its progeny. In the following section, this Note will explore the aspects of RICO
which have been used successfully to combat crime in the United States and will
build a model CSGS developed from these insights gained from RICO.
A. How RICO Can Guide a Model CSGS
Since its passage in 1970, RICO has been a highly successful tool in fighting
highly organized gangs, including the Mob, and has succeeded in striking fear into
many criminal organizations.163 Although at one time the target of sharp criticism
for overstepping its original purpose, RICO still provides a positive tool in the fight
against crime."6 Passed in 1970 as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act,
161 See, e.g., id. at 92-95. Mr. Levitt and Mr. Dubner compare dealing crack in Chicago to
a small-town girl who wants to become the next Julia Roberts, or a high-school quarterback
who trains to become the next Joe Montana. The chance of a very glamorous, very big payoff
is a large incentive for a lot of people to compete for very few spots at the top. Id. J.T., the head
drug dealer in Venkatesh's research, was paid much more than any of the undereducated urban
youth could hope to earn in a legal profession, and the allure that they could be him one day
drove many young gang members to sell crack despite it being the most dangerous job in
America. See id.
162 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).
163 Richard Valdemar, How to Make a RICO Case Against Gangs, POLICE MAGAZINE,
Nov. 20, 2008, available at http://www.policemag.com/Channels/Gangs/2008/11/20/How-to
-Make-a-RICO-Case-Against-Gangs.aspx ("Gang members know RICO can ruin their lives.").
64 See Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REv. 691,
692-93 (1990) (stating that meaningful reform or repeal of RICO is necessary as it has out-
lived its usefulness and infringes on defendants' rights); see also Sarah Baumgartel, The
Crime ofAssociating with Criminals? An Argumentfor Extending the Reves "Operation or
Management" Test to RICO Conspiracy, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,5 (2006) (stating
that RICO is currently used in business fraud, securities violations, political corruption, and
various white collar crimes).
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the purpose of RICO was to attack the roots and enterprises of organized crime.'
The addition of RICO allowed law enforcement to target not only traditional illegal
activities carried out by crime families such as La Cosa Nostra but also the legitimate
businesses that hid their corruption. 66 To successfully prosecute a RICO offense,
prosecutors must demonstrate the presence of a defendant "person," an "enterprise,"
and a pattern of racketeering acts. 67 Each of these elements has been routinely
interpreted broadly, 6 1 most notably that an enterprise could include other types of
enterprises, such as gangs. 69 RICO has successfully been used to prosecute highly
organized, widely syndicated criminal street gangs, such as the Mexican Mafia,
although less organized and more localized street gangs usually fall outside its pur-
view due to the lack of organization or "enterprise" activity present in street gangs. 70
Cities have, in the past, attempted to use RICO to inform civil statutes directed at curb-
ing gang activity but have been heavily criticized.' 7' Further, civil remedies to gangs
have attracted sharper attention, which will temper when applied in the context of
criminal penalties. 172 Despite this surrounding controversy, RICO can provide a work-
able framework against which to craft a model § 521 to target criminal gang activities.
1. Simplicity
RICO provides, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.' 7 It defines "pattern
16' See Baumgartel, supra note 164, at 3.
166 See id. at 3-4.
167 Id. at 5.
168 See Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 (2009) (stating that the "enterprise"
concept is broad and encompasses any group ofindividuals associated-in-fact); United States
v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding an enterprise where there is
dispute as to leadership, goals, and factions within the super gang, La Eme); United States v.
Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1559 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding an enterprise by what the organization
does rather than by analyzing its structure).
169 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981).
"70 See Lesley Suzanne Bonney, Comment, The Prosecution ofSophisticated Urban Street
Gangs: A Proper Application of RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 579, 580 (1993) ("RICO has
emerged as law enforcement's most effective tool for combating organized criminal activity.");
Ethan B. Gerber, Note, "A RICO You Can't Refuse ": New York's Organized Crime Control
Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 981 (1988) (noting RICO is a "powerful armament" in
prosecuting organized crime families); see also Valdemar, supra note 163.
,', See Chicago, Ill., MUN. CODE 8-4-015(a) (using language similar to RICO to define crim-
inal street gangs); see also Peter W. Poulos, Comment, Chicago 's Ban on Gang Loitering:
Making Sense of Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REv. 379,410-12
& n.216(1995) (criticizing Chicago's statute as unconstitutional).
172 See supra Part I.C (discussing the controversy surrounding City of Chicago v. Morales).
171 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
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of racketeering activity" as at least two acts of predicate crimes which are enumerated
in the statute. 74 The statute also defines "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity."'
175
Although this language is broad, courts have consistently applied the statute to
achieve clear elements that the government must prove to meet its burden.'T6 These
elements are often formed as (1) "an ongoing organization with some sort of frame-
work, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various members
and associates of the association function as a continuing unit to achieve a common
purpose.' ' 77 The courts have further clarified that the enterprise can be a formal or
informal group whose members function as a continuing unit. 17 These defined
elements have clarified the duties of prosecutors in presenting evidence for each of
these elements, as well as aid defendants in carefully preparing a defense. Delin-
eated elements have also aided the fact finder in either finding for or against RICO
liability.179 Similarly, a corresponding CSGS will need defined elements for courts
to apply consistently.
A model CSGS statute should meet constitutional and law enforcement challenges
by crafting its current provisions into defined elements. A model CSGS should re-
move the predicate crime aspect currently worded as a "'conviction' ... that a person
has committed an act ofjuvenile delinquency involving a violent or controlled sub-
stances felony."' 80 In its place, a model CSGS should outline the prohibited criminal
behavior, making it a crime to participate in a criminal street gang while participating
in a violent or controlled substances crime. Through removing the predicate crime, a
prosecutor would be able to charge § 521 as an independent criminal sanction charged
in an indictment. In practice, a model § 521 charge should accompany another violent
or controlled substance crime, but should also contain its own elements to be proven
to a jury.
174 Id. § 1961(5) (2006).
175 Id. § 1961(4) (2006).
176 See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 9, Boyle v. United States, No. 07-1309 (Dec. 22,
2008).
177 See id.
178 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
179 Compare Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66 (1997) (finding it sufficient for the
government to present evidence that the defendant committed two predicate acts to support
a conviction under RICO), and H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,250
(1989) (reversing a motion to dismiss and finding it was sufficient to plead a combination of
minor acts to show pattern of racketeering activity), with Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 547 U.S. 9,
15 (2007) (failing to find that the Respondents had properly pleaded the elements necessary
to sustain a RICO violation), and Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451,460-61
(2006) (declining to uphold a conviction under RICO where the plaintiff did not plead the
minimal elements of RICO including causation between acts and harm).
180 18 U.S.C. § 521(a) (1994).
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Additionally, a more substantive definition of "criminal street gang" should be
substituted for the current definition. Currently, a criminal street gang is defined as
"an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of 5 or more persons."'' This
definition is limiting and requires a finding of five distinct members. Criminal street
gangs typically consist of an amorphous number of members, making this line of five
members arbitrary and meaningless.182 In its place, a model CSGS should include
a definition of a gang similar to that discussed in Part I, including the following
elements: (1) durability; (2) street-oriented; (3) illegal; and (4) identity.83 These
categories are seemingly vague, but court decisions interpreting RICO and civil gang
injunctions will assist parties and courts in defining the concepts of durability and
identity."8 It will be crucial for courts to find the existence of all of the following,
coupled with a finding of causation between the membership in a gang and the violent
or substance control act to avoid constitutional issues, namely those of freedom of
association and assembly. 5
Additional elements should be included in part (a) of a model CSGS which are
now included under the heading of "circumstances" in part (d). 186 In order to remove
further vagueness and overbreadth, a model CSGS should require the prosecution
to prove the elements of: (1) knowledge that the participant's actions are in further-
ance of gang activity or to increase one's standing in the gang; (2) the actions would
in fact further a goal of the criminal street gang; (3) the actions are part of a pattern of
felonious actions by one or more members of the same continuous gang; and (4) the
participant was involved in a conspiracy to commit a felonious act on behalf of the
criminal street gang, of which he or she is a voluntary member.'87 Overall, through
181 Id.
182 See KLEIN & MAXSON, supra note 50, at 193-94.
183 See id. at 4.
'84 See id.
i"5 See Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality ofAnti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 31, 33-34 (1998) (discussing the possibility of a vague statute aimed at street gangs
being found void for vagueness by a court because of its "chilling" effect on speech and
freedom of association); see also Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal
Defense, 30 SANTACLARA L. REV. 739,776 (1990) (discussing overbreadth challenges to street
gang loitering laws); Alexander A. Molina, Note, California's Anti-Gang Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention Act: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 22 Sw. U. L. REV.
457, 457-58 (1993) (arguing that California's Act is unconstitutional as it makes unlawful
for an individual to join a gang).
186 18 U.S.C. § 521(d).
187 "Voluntary member" may be hard to prove, but it is at least an attempt to distinguish
between those who routinely participate in the gang, and may therefore be called members,
from those who participate in a single instance of felonious conduct without regard to how
the act may further the goals of the gang as a continuous group. See LEvrrr & DUBNER, supra
note 160. For a further discussion of the difficulties surrounding identifying members of a gang,
see Burrell, supra note 185, at 748.
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requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element and cau-
sation, a model street gang statute will likely avoid challenges of constitutionality.
2. Substantive Crime
Unlike the current CSGS, RICO operates as a substantive crime, thereby pre-
serving a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to notice of the charges against her and
the right to a trial by jury. 88 Under RICO, it is unlawful to participate in racketeer-
ing activities, commit two or more predicate crimes in furtherance of a continuing
enterprise, or conspire to do so."9 In order to find a defendant guilty under RICO,
the violation must be charged as a racketeering offense in violation of the code.' The
elements discussed above must be pleaded and proven to a fact finder, which is in
accord with a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Because RICO is a substantive
crime, it is constitutional in so far as it does not conflict with Apprendi v. New Jersey
or its progeny.' 9' The CSGS must be transformed into a substantive crime to serve
the same law enforcement and constitutional ends.
Transforming the current CSGS into a substantive crime is a relatively easy fix to
this particular problem. Currently, the penalty section states that a person convicted
of an offense in subsection (c) shall be increased by up to ten years. 2 A model CSGS
would simply transform the sentencing enhancement into a substantive penalty of
up to ten years in prison if convicted under this section. The remodeling of the pen-
alties provision would bring a model CSGS into conformity with Apprendi by pro-
viding Fifth Amendment due process rights and requiring a jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt the above elements. 3 Additionally, a defendant will have notice of
all the charges against him, conforming the CSGS to the Sixth Amendment; by care-
fully modeling the penalty so as it remains advisory, the model CSGS will not run
afoul of Booker. 94
3. Federal Jurisdiction and Forfeiture
RICO contains a jurisdictional requirement and a forfeiture clause that, if in-
cluded, would also assist a model CSGS in tracking gang-related crimes and targeting
gang incentives.
188 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
89 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006).
'90 See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, andApplication ofRacketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U. S. C.A. §§ 1961 et seq. -Supreme Court Cases,
171 A.L.R. FED. 1, 15 (2001).
' ' See id. at 14-15.
'92 18 U.S.C. § 521(b) (1994).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485-92 (2000).
'94 See supra Part III.B for a discussion of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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The interstate commerce provision grants federal courts jurisdiction over any
racketeering activity or conspiracy to commit a racketeering activity which affects
interstate commerce.195 A similar provision is currently included in the CSGS and
should remain prominent in the model act.' 96 This powerful jurisdictional hook has
helped law enforcement tie criminal acts together into a pattern of racketeering at the
federal level, encapsulating all the acts of criminal organizations that fall under the
purview of RICO. Courts have interpreted "affects interstate commerce" broadly to
include almost any use of the United States mail system, phone lines, and any trans-
portation across state lines as affecting interstate commerce. 9 7 Originally, courts
interpreted the clause to mean that the total enterprise itself had to affect interstate
commerce.198 Recently, however, courts have exercised this jurisdictional require-
ment by allowing the government to demonstrate that the predicate acts have a de
minimis impact on interstate commerce. 99 Courts have additionally held that, where
a statute makes it a crime to commit acts for the purpose of maintaining or increasing
one's position in a racketeering enterprise, it is not required that the acts themselves
affect interstate commerce."' This particular aspect of RICO will aid in supplement-
ing the CSGS by coordinating law enforcement at the federal level to create a larger
interstate enterprise, as well as aiding prosecutors by creating a definable jurisdic-
tional element to plead without creating an insurmountable barrier to charging gang
acts, committed in discrete states, at the federal level. Additionally, it is worth men-
tioning that courts have found that "affecting interstate commerce" does not demand
an economic motive to the crime to qualify under RICO.20' Should courts continue
'9' 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(c) (2006) ("any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce").
196 18 U.S.C. § 521(a)(C) (1994) ("the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce").
' See, e.g., Scheidlerv. NOW, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006) (charging a pro-life protest group
under RICO and finding it satisfied the interstate commerce requirement because the peti-
tioners used mail and phone lines); see also Fay Clayton & Sara N. Love, NOW v. Scheidler:
Protecting Women's Access to Reproductive Health Services, 62 ALB. L. REV. 967, 977
(1999) (discussing the use of the phone lines and wiretaps that were necessary to plead a
RICO violation).
19 See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 854 (7th Cir. 1977) (requiring the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the enterprise itself affects interstate commerce in order to prosecute
a RICO claim); see also Amy Franklin et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,
45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 871, 888 (2008).
199 See United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the acts of gang members "had a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce"); see
also Franklin, supra note 198, at 888-89 ("This element may be satisfied if the enterprise's
activities have an impact on interstate commerce.").
200 See Franklin, supra note 198, at 889.
201 See United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942,950 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding convictions
under RICO, even though the charged arsons had no financial benefit to the enterprise); see
also Jennifer Bullock, Note, National Organization for Women v. Scheidler: RICO and the
2009]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
to interpret interstate jurisdictional clauses broadly, CSGS would benefit from this
element to clarify and coordinate prosecutorial efforts.
RICO also contains a forfeiture clause that, if used in a revised CSGS statute,
would provide an element that specifically tackles gang motivations-primarily,
money and power.20 2 RICO contains both criminal and civil forfeiture provisions,
but most pertinent to this Note is the criminal forfeiture provision °.2 3 Although jail
time is undesirable for most citizens, the forfeiture targets a set of economic values
that may strike a harder blow to gang members than jail time. 24 A key aspect of the
forfeiture provision as applied in RICO, is the relation back doctrine that provides the
"government's title to forfeitable property vests at the time of the commission of the
predicate acts. 2 5 The forfeiture provision has been utilized in RICO charges to divest
those convicted of real property crimes, including the defendant's joint interest in real
property, 2°6 business interests and assets, 20 7 and any proceeds or personal property pur-
chased with proceeds flowing from racketeering activity. °8 in complex RICO cases,
the assets seized were usually large and able to be tied to the individuals implicated
in the RICO charges through a paper trail.2°9
In the case of smaller, criminal street gangs, the ability of law enforcement to
tie the personal property of a gang member to a pattern of acts will be more difficult
due to the disorganization of street gangs, as well as the expansive black market in
which street gangs operate.2 " Despite these difficulties, a forfeiture provision would
more adequately target the desires of the young people who join gangs. Statistics
Economic Motive Requirement, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1533, 1540-42 (1994) (reviewing RICO's
legislative history and Supreme Court ruling which have determined that Congress intended
no economic motive requirement in RICO).
202 See LEvrrr & DUBNER, supra note 160 (discussing gang motivations); see also S. REP.
No. 91-617, at 79 (1969) ("What is needed here.., are new approaches [to] deal.., with
the economic base through which [these] individuals constitute such a serious threat to the
economic well-being of the Nation.").
203 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a)(3) (2006) ("Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this
chapter... shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law...
any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly
or indirectly, from racketeering activity....").
204 See Elizabeth A. Skorcz, Comment, RICO Forfeiture: Secured Lenders Beware, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1207 (1990) (noting that criminal activities could still be delegated to
a colleague while in prison).
205 See id. at 1202.
206 See, e.g., Pacheco v. Serendensky, 393 F.3d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 2004).
207 See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
208 See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
209 See, e.g., Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29,45 (1995) (discussing forfeiture of home
and parcel of land in Wyoming).
210 See SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF
THE URBAN POOR xii-xv (2006) (chronicling a sociologist's first experiences with the large
underground black market in Chicago).
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show that although gangs can easily recruit new members to replace those who have
been arrested, acquiring new weapons, ammunition, and drugs creates problems for
street gangs without an influx of legitimate income.2 1' Forfeiture is more difficult
to trace because of lack of an ownership paper trail present in more organized crime
enterprises. It is still possible, however, to focus on the personal property provision
of RICO, by confiscating all personal property, clothing, jewelry, cell phones, and
other personal property tied to a convicted felon under the model § 521. This would
be easily accomplished through confiscating all personal property found on the gang
member when arrested after he is convicted. Also, cars, cell phones, and jewelry can
be traced to an individual through documentation.
In addition to a traditional forfeiture provision, a regulation used in connection
with § 521 aimed at targeting federal public housing assistance would further the goals
of deterrence and further attack gang life in a meaningful way. Although much public
housing is subsidized on the state level, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1998 was passed
with the goal of giving local housing agencies and others who supervise federally
assisted housing discretion to deny "housing when any household member uses
alcohol in a way that interferes with the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment"
of the other tenants.212 The bill also includes the right to exclude based on illegal drug
use and other drug-related criminal activity. 23 Although this particular act is contro-
versial for its ban on public housing for life,214 a model § 521 would include a pro-
vision preempting the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1998 and replacing it with a provision
that a defendant convicted under § 521 would be banned from public assistance hous-
ing for a stated period oftime. This would reinforce the seriousness of the punishment
as well as serve to deter individuals from participating willingly in gang related crimes.
A model CSGS that achieves the goals of(1) simplicity, (2) creating a substantive
crime, (3) maintaining broad federal jurisdiction, and (4) targeting traditional incen-
tives of criminal street gangs would be the most precise way to charge those involved
in violent street gang activity powerfully, while also protecting the constitutional
rights of those accused of membership in a street gang. The following section will
provide an explanation of how this Note's model § 521 will withstand a facial
211 See supra Part L.A (discussing gangs generally).
212 Feature: The Conviction that Keeps On Hurting-Drug Offenders and Federal Benefits,
DRUGWARCHRONICLE, Feb. 5,2007, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/47 /drugoffenders
_lose federal-benefits.
213 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (amended
1998).
214 See Feature: The Conviction that Keeps on Hurting, supra note 212 (discussing the
controversy surrounding the continued penalization of drug offenders); see also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS
OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF SELECTED BENEFITS (2005), available at
http://www.stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/47 I/drugoffenders lose federalbenefits (discussing
the limits ofbroad sweeping federal legislation on the ability to police drug-related offenses).
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constitutional challenge and why this model statute will be better suited to achieve
the goals of law enforcement.
VI. A RETURN TO APPRENDI: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MODEL CSGS
In Part III above, a number of constitutional concerns were discussed that would
primarily impact the constitutionality of the current CSGS if § 521 is challenged on
its face.215 Although that challenge has not yet occurred, the dubious constitutionality
of the CSGS has essentially rendered the statute inoperable for law enforcement. The
model CSGS proposed in this Note addresses these concerns and attempts to create
an operable and effective statute to battle the war on criminal street gangs. It does
so through preserving the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, while re-
moving the complex predicate crimes structure which bars tough prosecution of one-
time offenders.
In Matthews II, discussed in Part III.C, the Fifth Circuit correctly addressed the
issue of CSGS's affect on Matthews's sentence, but eventually came to an unconstitu-
tional outcome.216 The court stated that, in light ofApprendi v. New Jersey, the district
court must require the jury to find the facts of the CSGS beyond a reasonable doubt
where they have been pled in the indictment to grant Matthews's Fifth Amendment
right to due process,2 17 his Sixth Amendment rights to notice of the charges against
him, " and his right to a jury.2 19 In spite of this ruling, the court in Matthews II
declined to either overturn Matthews's sentencing enhancement, or to find § 521 un-
constitutional. 20 The Fifth Circuit's logic was flawed. Their decision to record con-
clusions of law that point to declaring the CSGS unconstitutional, but to refuse to
actually do so, does not result in logical case law. Regardless of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to extend Apprendi,22' the Fifth Circuit's formulation of the violation of
Matthews's rights warrants a finding of the CSGS as unconstitutional.
The model CSGS would solve the constitutional problems and render CSGS
usable to federal law enforcement in the battle against gangs. The model CSGS also
211 See supra Part III (discussing the current constitutionality issues of the CSGS).
216 United States v. Mathews, 312 F.3d 652, 652,662-63 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied538
U.S. 938 (2003).
217 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 227, 243 n.6
(1999) ("[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact... that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to ajury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
218 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
239 Id.; Matthews, 312 F.3d at 662-63.
220 Matthews, 312 F.3d at 664.
221 Seesupra Part I1.B (discussing Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,545 (2002) and the
Court's refusal to apply the holding ofApprendi to facts which increase a sentencing minimum).
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would have resulted in a more just result for Jeffrey Matthews. Apprendi charges a
court dealing with a federal statute to ensure that the statute entitles a criminal defen-
dant to "a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime he is
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 22 The model CSGS provides for a substantive
crime that must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. The inclusion of a clear elemental definition of what constitutes a criminal
street gang, and narrowly tailored elements will ensure the criminal defendant has
notice of the charges against him, and can properly prepare a defense. By requiring
the government to prove an alleged member's knowledge that his actions would fur-
ther the goals of the criminal street gang, the actions would further the street gang, the
actions constitute felonious activity by one or more members of the same continuous
gang, or there was a conspiracy to engage in the charged activity, the prosecutors will
also have a clearly defined task. This is a higher burden on the prosecutor's office,
but will ensure that criminal convictions under the model CSGS would be unassailable
on appeal. The model CSGS would adequately "guard against a spirit of oppression
and tyranny" that forms the backbone of the Constitution, and the model CSGS would
conform the current CSGS to that goal.223
Although the criminal defendant's rights are the paramount concern in Apprendi,
the model CSGS would serve an added benefit over current attempts to change § 521
by creating a substantive crime that would be chargeable upon the first instance of a
criminal street gang member's illegal conduct. An element in the model CSGS would
require the establishment of a pattern of felonious actions by one or more members
of the same gang, a requirement similar to RICO. However, the individual on trial
does not necessarily have to be the member who previously committed a crime.224
Once a prosecutor establishes that the individual is a member of the criminal street
gang and had knowledge that her actions would further the gang's activities, the prose-
cutor may establish the existence of other felonious actions by introducing the prior
convictions of members of the same gang.2 5 Through this structure, the model CSGS
222 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2001) (quoting United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993).
223 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNIrED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873)).
224 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (finding that commission of sepa-
rate crimes and conspiracy for those crimes were distinct charges, and thus defendants could
be charged with both crime and conspiracy).
225 Introduction of this type of evidence will be granted with the court's discretion after
the judge balances the probative value over the prejudicial effect. FED. R. EvID. 403. Intro-
duction through a lay witness of community reputation of the gang members and activity
may provide the proper forum for introduction of some of this evidence, as would police
records and prior convictions under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. FED.
R. EViD. 701 and 803. The evidentiary aspects of the model CSGS would be best suited for
another article, however.
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avoids the traps of the earlier attempts to alter the current CSGS.226 Also, the predicate
crimes structures of the other statutes require a criminal to commit more than one
crime to be eligible for the punishments of the CSGS. 227 The model CSGS would
put dangerous gang members behind bars the first time a defendant is convicted, as
well as render them susceptible to the additional punishments of forfeiture and the
loss of public assistance housing. 28 The structure of the model CSGS would pro-
vide the alleged criminal street gang members with protections of their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.229 Finally, if a prosecutor can meet his or her burden of proof, the
member of the gang will be punished the first time charged and be eligible for addi-
tional punishment in a way that targets the gang member's economic incentives.
CONCLUSION
Criminal street gangs are a growing problem, nearing epidemic proportions
throughout the United States. The amorphous size and disorganization of criminal
street gangs have presented numerous difficulties to law enforcement attempting to
make a meaningful dent in the violence. Although localities, and even Congress, have
attempted various solutions to curb gang violence, there is currently no constitutional
federal law to increase penalties for dangerous gangs. The model CSGS, advocated
for here, would provide constitutional guarantees to criminal defendants, like Jeffrey
Matthews, while aiding in law enforcement's ability to charge gang members severely
on their first conviction. The model CSGS would provide a valuable tool in the
federal arsenal against gang violence.
226 See supra Part V (outlining earlier congressional attempts to alter the CSGS).
227 See supra note 148 & accompanying text (discussing the predicate crimes of the Fighting
Gangs and Empowering Youth Act of 2007); see also supra note 152 & accompanying text
(discussing the "two or more" required predicate crimes of the Anti-Gang Enforcement Act
of 2007).
228 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(c) (2006).
229 See supra note 217 & accompanying text.
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